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Abstract
Steroid hormones, such as testosterone, have been shown to affect risk prefer-
ences in financial traders with high levels leading to excessive risk-taking. Hor-
mone levels, in turn, are affected by trading outcomes as well as by gender - males
are more sensitive to stimuli than females. We develop a model to investigate
the effects of hormones on financial market stability and trader performance. An
increase in the proportion of female traders does not necessarily make markets
less volatile; however, it reduces the occurrence of market crashes. Male traders
on average under-perform females, although the best performing individuals are
more likely to be male.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade, there has been considerable discussion in the media on excessive
risk-taking in financial markets. In particular, ‘reckless’ risk-taking by traders was, at
least partly, blamed for the turmoils and crashes observed in recent years.1 It was also
mentioned that traders are ‘too male’ both in terms of their numbers as well as in the
excessively masculine culture of trading floors (e.g., Coates, 2012; Eckel and Fullbrunn,
2015). Consequently, there have been arguments from academics (e.g., Coates et al.,
2010), the popular press (e.g., The Guardian, 2012; Time, 2012) and policy makers
(e.g., Lagarde, 2013) that a more balanced gender ratio would reduce volatility and
help stabilize markets. Our objective in this paper is to study this issue: we develop
a theoretical model to examine how a change in the gender balance of traders affects
their performance and the stability of financial markets.
Physiological studies have shown that steroid hormones, for example testosterone,
affect risk preference in humans. High levels of testosterone have been shown to be
associated with greater, even excessive, amounts of risky behavior (e.g., Apicella et
al., 2008 in the blood stream; Garbarino et al., 2011, pre-natally via digit ratios) and
asset market bubbles (e.g., Nadler et al., 2015), while cortisol has been shown to affect
risk preference and to predict market instability (e.g., Cueva et al., 2015). Moreover,
there are feedback effects: while hormones affect behavior, outcomes resulting from
such behavior and the market uncertainty in turn may affect hormone levels. In terms
of testosterone, levels increase (decrease) in response to success (failure). It has also
been demonstrated that there are systematic differences between males and females in
this regard: men tend to have higher levels of testosterone as well as experience greater
fluctuations in their levels than women (e.g., Kivilighan et al., 2005).
It is the greater sensitivity to gains and losses that has led to some policy makers,
1See for example The Guardian, 2011, Time, 2012, 2013.
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academics and the popular press to call for a reduction in the proportion of male traders
in financial markets in order to enhance stability. However, even when the behavior of
individual male traders is generally more volatile than that of female traders, it is not
immediately clear that a decrease in the proportion of male traders would necessarily
make markets less volatile. Returns from trading, particularly at short time horizons,
are to a large extent affected by trends and dynamics resulting from the trading behavior
of others. It is these effects that proponents of the above policy wish to dampen through
changing the gender ratio. However, price movements arise from the interactions of
many trading strategies, together with the arrival of information, such that it is not
possible to deduce a straightforward relationship between market volatility and the
proportions of male and female traders. An interesting result of our model is that an
increase in the proportion of female traders makes markets more volatile. However, this
finding is with respect to the standard measure of volatility as used in academia and
industry; in the popular press the word ‘volatility’ is often associated with instability.
In that regard we find the opposite: a decrease in the proportion of male traders does
make the occurrences of extreme events less likely.
To analyze the effects of hormones, we consider a simple trading model in the tradi-
tion of De Long et al. (1990b) and Brock and Hommes (1998). In our model, informed
and positive feedback traders trade over multiple periods in a risky and a riskless asset.
Traders have time-varying risk preferences that affect their choice of portfolio com-
positions. There has been much work examining the form of utility functions (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Vayanos, 2001) and
the degree of risk aversion of individuals (e.g., Longstaff and Wang, 2012; Chabakauri,
2013; Bhamra and Uppal, 2014); these studies, however, assume that choices are made
over time based on fixed risk preferences. As argued above, risk preferences not only
differ across individuals but also vary over time for a given individual in response to
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outcomes from individuals’ actions as well as the market uncertainty. Traders who
make profits become less risk-averse, whereas those who make losses become more so.
We incorporate these effects in our model by allowing a trader’s risk preference to vary
in response to the results of recent trades. Each trader chooses a portfolio in every
period to maximize expected utility from wealth with the optimal choices depending
on the trader’s risk preference. When the realized return from the chosen portfolio is
higher (lower) than the expected return, the risk aversion parameter for the next period
decreases (increases) given the impact of testosterone. The effect is that success results
in an increase in appetite for risk-taking whereas failure lowers it. A crucial issue is
not just that risk preferences change but that this variation is systematically different
between males and females. To incorporate this we allow in our model the extent of
the effect to vary between traders.
The results of our model show that an increase in the proportion of female traders
increases the volatility of the asset prices. The presence of a larger fraction of male
traders however increases the chances of extreme events. We also find that while fe-
male traders have higher average earnings than male traders, the best and the worst
performing traders are likely to be male. As we discuss more in the concluding section,
our results indicates a possible difficulty of changing the gender balance of the trading
population in a culture that only rewards star traders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant
literature on asset pricing methods and the role of hormones in mediating financial be-
haviors and risk preferences. Section 3 sets out our model incorporating heterogeneous
beliefs and time-varying endogenous risk preferences. Section 4 presents details on the
impact of testosterone on market and individual behaviors. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the literature concerning physiological effects on economic be-
havior. While research in this area is still ongoing and clearly more work needs to be
done to establish the exact pathway through which the physiological factors like hor-
mones affect specific aspects of behavior, there is by now enough evidence to make the
case linking hormones, risk preferences and their effects on actions and performances
of financial traders.2
Outcomes and hormonal fluctuations have been shown to be related by several stud-
ies. Apicella et al. (2014), for instance, show that trading results (monetary rewards)
of males affect their circulatory hormone levels with high performance linked to higher
levels of testosterone. Coates and Herbert (2008) examine the relation between levels
of testosterone and trading performance using a sample of male traders and find testos-
terone level in the morning being positively correlated with profits during the day.
While Kivlighan et al. (2005) study individual’s endocrine responses to competitive
settings (rowing) varied significantly by gender. This study finds that not only do men
have higher baseline testosterone levels than women, the levels for men change signifi-
cantly more than that of women in the post-event phase. The reason for this greater
responsiveness has been argued to be due to the differences in the brain physiology and
the early exposures to testosterone (e.g., Cronqvist et al., 2015).
There are also studies showing the relation between outcomes and risk aversion.
Hoffmann and Post (2017) find investors’ risk tolerance to be positively related to
their return experience. They study how personal return and risk experience drive
updates in individual investors’ beliefs and preferences with brokerage records and
monthly survey data. They find that investors’ risk tolerance is positively related to
2There is also the literature studying the relation between hormones and social behavior more
broadly. We omit discussing this literature here but it is somewhat related and we would be happy to
provide references upon request.
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their return experience. Filippin and Gioia (2018) study the effect of competition on
subsequent risk-behavior and find heterogeneity between genders. They carry out a
laboratory experiment in which competition occurs in the Coin Task (a real effort task
that consists of recognizing the value and the country of a Euro’s origin). They see
significant relative difference between men and women in how outcomes affect their risk
aversion - men become more risk averse after losing while risk-aversion among women
is practically unaffected.
Finally there is also work showing the relation between hormones and risk aversion.
Coates and Gurnell (2017) survey this work showing fluctuations in classical endocrine
pathways to be a significant determinant of changing risk preferences. Apicella et al.
(2008) and Apicella et al. (2014) both find circulatory testosterone to be positively
correlated with risk taking in men. Coates and Page (2009) investigate associations
between prenatal testosterone levels and financial risk preferences. They look at the
digit ratio’s of real traders and find that increases in testosterone lead to greater risk-
taking. Cueva et al. ( 2015) studied the role of administered testosterone and find that
it is associated with greater financial risk-taking.
Whilst not focusing on hormones, Cueva and Rustichini (2015) consider the role of
gender in markets. These authors run market experiments on small groups of single and
mixed sex participants in an open plan setting, and find that the mixed sex markets
demonstrated better stability. They explain this finding as being driven by low cognitive
ability traders being more cautious in mixed gender environments. These findings are
in agreement with the meta-analysis of Eckel and Fullbrunn (2015) who show that
the size and frequency of price bubbles are decreasing in the proportion of females
in experimental markets. Holt et al. (2017) whilst demonstrating a similar result
for markets with a changing fundamental value, in the case of a market with a flat
fundamental value they find no effect of gender composition.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on traders with wrong beliefs (sometimes
called irrational traders in the literature) in that we particularly consider on the effect
of hormones on speculative technical traders. Friedman (1953) argued that such traders
cannot influence long-run asset prices because they consistently lose money. This argu-
ment was further elaborated on by Muth (1961), Fama (1965) and Lucas (1972), and
was used in studies on market efficiency in the presence of noise traders (e.g., Kyle,
1985; De Long et al., 1990a; Campbell and Kyle, 1993; Guo and Ou-Yang, 2015). How-
ever, De Long et al. (1990b) demonstrate that traders with wrong beliefs may survive
under certain market conditions, while Saacke (2002) and Kogan et al. (2006) show
that irrational traders can affect prices and persist for long periods in markets. Such
effects have also been shown in models such as Chiarella et al. (2006) and Brock and
Hommes (1998) where the interaction of trading strategies results in persistent and
substantial deviations from the fundamental value.3
3 The Model
The model is constructed in the spirit of De Long et al. (1990b), based on the frame-
works of Chiarella (1992), Brock and Hommes (1998) and in particular that of Chiarella,
Dieci, and Gardini (2006). Consider a market populated by two types of traders, in-
formed and positive feedback (denoted by h ∈ {I, PF}), where informed traders know
the underlying dividend process. The market allows the trade of a risky asset and a
risk-free asset. Denote by pt the ex-dividend price per share of the risky asset at time
t and yt the stochastic dividend distributed in period t. Traders may choose to invest
in the risk-free asset with a gross return R or to borrow at the same rate, R ≥ 1.
Let wt denote the trader’s wealth at time t and Qt the number of shares of the risky
3For more discussions on heterogeneous agent-based models in finance, see surveys by Hommes
(2006) and LeBaron (2006).
6
asset purchased or shorted at price pt at time t. Wealth of agents evolves according to
wt+1 = Rwt + (pt+1 + yt+1 −Rpt)Qt (1)
In period t, each type of trader has an expectation of the excess return per share of
the risky asset for the coming period t+ 1 and therefore the price and dividend return
in that period, Eh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt]. Expectations are conditional expectation but
for notational simplicity we henceforth refer to them as expectations. Expectations are
formed based on information up to and including the current period t, we detail in the
next section how these are calculated. Similarly the price pt in the above is the price
at which the market clears based on expectations, and information available, at time
t− 1.
Let ah,t denote the level of risk aversion of agent-type h at time t. Traders are







subject to Equation (1). In our study, traders have time-varying risk preferences.
Eh,t[.] and V arh,t[.] are the subjective conditional expectation and conditional variance
respectively given their beliefs. The conditional variance of wealth wt+1 is
V arh,t[wt+1] = Q
2
h,tV arh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 −Rpt] (3)
where the conditional variance of excess returns is assumed to be fixed over time and
normalized to V arh,t = V ar for all traders.
4 The optimal quantity for trader-type h is




Eh,t[pt+1 + yt+1 −Rpt]
ah,tV ar
(4)
Let nh represent the proportion of trader-type h in the market (
∑
nh = 1) and Qst
the supply of shares per investor. Equilibrium of demand and supply in the market
leads to ∑
nhQh,t = Qst (5)
When there is only one type of trader in the market, market equilibrium indicates
Eh,t[pt+1 + yt+1]−Rpt = ah,tV arQst (6)
In the special case of zero supply of outside shares, the required expected return becomes
Et[p
∗
t+1 + yt+1] = Rp
∗
t (7)
where p∗t is the fundamental value (i.e., present value of future dividends) of the risky
asset at time t and Et[p
∗
t+1 + yt+1] represents the expectation of the fundamental value
and dividend conditional on the information set of past prices and dividends.6
In each period, the risky asset distributes a stochastic dividend. The dividend
follows an i.i.d. process with mean value ȳ and
yt = ȳ + εt (8)
the noise component {εt} is an i.i.d. stochastic process with mean 0. Innovations of
dividends are independent across periods. For this process the best estimate of the
5Short selling is permitted (Qh,t < 0).
6In the case of positive supply, risk-averse traders require a positive risk premium to hold the risky
asset.
8
future dividend is the mean ȳ.7
3.1 Beliefs
Informed traders estimate the gross return per share according to
EI,t[pt+1 + yt+1] = Et[p
∗
t+1 + yt+1] (9)
where Et[p
∗
t+1 + yt+1] is the common, amongst informed traders, expectation of the
fundamental and dividend.
Informed traders believe that the price of the risky asset is determined by its fun-
damental value, the discounted value of future dividends. They are informed of the
underlying dividend processes but not the dividend in any future period.
The second type of trader, positive feedback traders, attempt to profit by exploiting
market trends. Positive feedback traders estimate the capital gain by the use of an
exponentially weighted moving average of previous returns
EPF,t[pt+1] = pt(1 + c(
pt − pt−1
pt−1




where c is the weight on the most recent percentage observation, 0 < c < 1. Note at
time t the price pt (and all previous prices) are known therefore giving a unique belief





) + (1− g)EPF,t−1[
yt
pt−1
]), 0 < g < 1 (11)
where g is the weight on the most recent dividend yield. Positive feedback traders rely
7Our results are robust to alternative dividend processes, namely, the first order auto-regressive
process (AR(1)) and the two-state Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process, see Appendix A. Under the
two-state OU process the model generates serially uncorrelated returns.
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on only past prices and dividends in making their trading decisions.
Trade therefore happens between these two types of traders when there are dis-
agreements on the asset value and price movements. In every period, the demands
of both types of trades are calculated from their expectations via Equation (4). The
asset price, pt, is then determined endogenously by demand and supply as specified
by Equation (5). The substitution results in a quadratic equation in one unknown, pt,
with all other terms being known. The positive route is selected as the price.
3.2 Performance Feedback and Risk Aversion
In each period, traders calculate their demand based on their levels of risk aversion,
conditional expectations and conditional variance of future excess returns per share (as
described above). The results of trading are determined by actual excess return per
share, denoted by ∆rt = pt + yt − Rpt−1. A trader’s level of satisfaction given the
outcome of trade is calculated as
Zh,t = sgn(
∆rt
Eh,t−1[pt + yt −Rpt−1]
)|∆rt| (12)
Where sgn is the sign function returning 1 for values > 0, −1 for values < 0 and
0 otherwise. We define a positive (negative) outcome as the occasion when traders
correctly (incorrectly) estimate the sign of the excess return, Zh,t > 0 (Zh,t < 0).
i.e. all positive profits are deemed positive outcomes.8 The absolute value of this term,
controlled by ∆rh, defines the degree to which this is positive or negative.
9 We also con-
sidered other ways of defining the positive outcome from trading as the true functional
8This is calculated via the sgn function. If the expectation and realization are the same sign then
the function will be positive. If they differ the output will be negative. In practice the denominator is
almost never 0 due to continuously distributed dividends. In the exceptionally rare case (with 64 bit
machine precision) that it is zero the sign is defined by the sign of the numerator.
9This includes both those occasions when profits are greater than, and those when they are less
than, the traders expectation as positive outcomes as long as they are positive.
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form of humans’ responses to trading performance is only known approximately. One




in which a positive outcome happens when the realized profit is greater than the ex-
pected excess return per share, ∆rt
Eh,t−1[pt+yt−Rpt−1]
> 1. With this alternative measure of
positive outcomes, results are qualitatively similar to those with Equation (12).
Within each type of trading strategy (denoted by j) we consider two sub-groups
of traders, namely female traders (F ) and male traders (M). Each trader type has a
function F jh,t, which reflects the change in levels of testosterone in response to trading
outcomes. While the exact shape of the relationships between outcomes, testosterone
levels and risk aversion are not known research has demonstrated several key features.
Positive (negative) outcomes result in increased (decreased) testosterone levels and
decreased (increased) risk aversion (Mazur and Booth, 1998; Coates and Herbert, 2008)
whilst testosterone levels are also persistent over time and saturate (e.g., Van Honk et
al., 2004; Sapienza et al., 2009). A number of functional forms would describe such
a relationship. We adopt one such function F jh,t(Zh,t) which models the change in
testosterone levels in response to stimulus and has an increasing and asymptotically
bounded form




j > 0 (13)
where κj measures the degree of testosterone fluctuations of sub-group j and the con-
stant 2
π
ensures that the function F jh,t is centered around 0 with range (−κj, κj).10
Traders having positive outcomes (Zh,t > 0) have their levels of testosterone rise cor-
respondingly (F jh,t > 0), while negative outcomes (Zh,t < 0) lead to declining levels of
testosterone (F jh,t < 0). Heterogeneity between female and male traders in our model
lies in the degree of hormonal responses to trading outcomes: testosterone levels in
males being highly responsive to trading outcomes compared to females, κM > κF
10Although note the range of this function does not qualitatively change the results.
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(see for example Kivilighan et al., 2005). We model informed traders as having fixed
risk aversion while positive feedback traders have heterogeneously time-varying risk
preferences. This clarifies the mechanism driving our findings.11 However, results are
qualitatively similar when we allow for both informed traders and positive feedback
traders having heterogeneous time-varying risk preferences (see Appendix B).
Based on the changes in testosterone levels, traders’ risk aversion varies according





h,t), γ > 0 (14)
where elevated testosterone levels (F jh,t > 0) decrease traders’ levels of risk aversion
thereafter (ajh,t < a
j
h,t−1). Parameter γ measures the magnitude of the effects of testos-
terone on traders’ risk aversions.12 Traders that achieved good trading outcomes be-
come less risk-averse in the subsequent trading period due to their elevated testosterone
levels.
Both informed traders and positive feedback traders estimate future price move-
ments and make trading decisions according to their beliefs. The price of the risky
asset is determined by the collective demand and supply in the market. Actual excess
returns per share from the risky asset come from both price movements and dividends.
It is the divergence between actual returns and previous estimations of it that causes
fluctuations of testosterone levels, affecting agents’ risk preferences and therefore their
trading decisions. Here we consider two groups within the population of positive feed-
11This separation also captures the intuition that positive feedback traders represent speculators,
such as day traders, who often work in the highly male-dominated workplaces discussed above. As
the informed traders rely more on their information of the fundamental value, they may be considered
less responsive to periodical returns and have a fixed level of risk preference over the finite period of
trading.
12Parameter values are calibrated on the basis of recent experimental studies, see Section 4.1 for
details.
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back traders which respond differently to gains and losses. Given the same trading
outcome, male positive feedback traders experience greater elevations (drops) in lev-
els of testosterone and thus their risk aversion decreases (increases) more than that of
female positive feedback traders.
4 Results
In this section we present results from the analysis of the model by considering the
impact of testosterone on trader behavior. The inclusion of endogenous time-varying
risk aversion makes the model analytically intractable. As a result the behavior of
the model and the effect of the composition of traders on this behaviors are analyzed
numerically.
4.1 Parametrization
At each time step, the risky asset distributes a stochastic dividend with mean ȳ = 1 and
a noise component εt uniformly distributed on the interval [−1, 1]. The gross risk-free
return is R = 1.01. The fundamental value of the risky asset at the beginning of the
first period is p∗ = 100.13 The conditional variance of excess returns per share V ar,
is normalized to 1 and the level of risk aversion for informed traders, aI , is fixed at 3.
The initial level of risk aversion at the start of the simulation for both male and female
positive traders is also set to 3 for both groups in order to more clearly highlight the
effects of the hormonal mechanism. While in experimental studies (e.g., Hartog et al.,
2002) risk aversion in men is estimated to be 30% lower than for women, including this
within the model did not qualitatively change our results. We, therefore, have chosen to
omit it in order to more clearly show the effect of the endogenous risk aversion process.
13These parameters satisfy the no-bubble condition. See Brock and Hommes (1998) for a detailed
analysis of the no-bubble condition.
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In each period, informed traders estimate the fundamental value of the risky asset as
the present value of its discounted future dividends. In determining their beliefs about
future returns positive feedback traders set the weight on the most recent observation
as c = 0.2, while the weight on most recent dividend yield is g = 0.5.14
The degree of testosterone fluctuations for male traders, κM , is calibrated on the
basis of experimental studies. According to the study of Coates and Herbert (2008),
trader’s level of testosterone rose by 74%, when the trader achieved 6-day winning
streak with twice his average daily profits. We compute the value of κM as the daily
testosterone fluctuation, which is 0.0874 approximately. According to Cueva et al.
(2015), the levels of testosterone in female traders are around half as variable as those
of male traders. Thus, the degree of testosterone fluctuation for female traders, κF ,
is considered to be half of κM . The degree of testosterone’s impact on traders’ risk
aversion, γ, is calibrated based on the experimental study of Apicella et al. (2014). In
their study, individuals have to split an amount of money between a riskless and risky
investment. They found that an individuals risk aversion is reduced by 1.413% when
the levels of testosterone rose by 1%. From from this we compute the sensitivity of risk
aversion to γ = 0.2569.
The total number of time steps per simulated time series is T = 1000. The evolution
of the market price is path dependent as the trading decisions of each trader in each
time step affect market prices, trader’s payoffs and thus trading decisions in future
periods. For each parameter combination 1000 repetitions were conducted (i.e., runs,
denoted by N), with different random draws from the dividend process. To maintain
comparability between parameter combinations, the same 1000 dividend paths are used
in each case. The parameters for the numerical analysis are presented in Table 1.
14We tested different values of c and g and our results are robust for c < 0.7. For c ≥ 0.7, the
prices become unrealistically volatile. The use of the exponentially weighted moving average avoids
the highly unstable prices.
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Table 1: Baseline Parametrization
Parameter Meaning Value
ȳ Mean dividend 1
εt Noise component U(−1, 1)
R Risk-free return 1.01
p∗ Initial fundamental value 100
V ar Conditional variance of excess return 1
aI Level of risk aversion for informed traders 3
c Weight on most recent percentage price change 0.2
g Weight on most recent dividend yield 0.5
κF Testosterone sensitivity for female traders 0.04865
κM Testosterone sensitivity for male traders 0.0973
γ Testosterone’s impact on risk aversions 0.2569
T Number of time steps 1000
N Number of runs 1000
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4.2 Market Stability
In this section we show how traders with testosterone mediated risk preferences affect
overall market stability. To do this we consider three cases. The first two illustrate the
hormonal effects for two ratios of male and female positive feedback traders: 95% male
to 5% female and 50% male to 50% female. The composition of 95% male to 5% female
is close to the observed real world composition of trading floors.15 The composition of
50% male to 50% female is representative of the approximate distribution in the general
population and is in line with opinions in the mainstream media, which argue this ratio
would stabilize markets.16 In the following discussion we refer to the first of these two
as the real composition and the second as the balanced composition. 17The final case
is a benchmark in which hormones do not play a role and both informed traders and
positive feedback traders have fixed levels of risk aversions, i.e. γ = 0.
Table 2 reports results examining market stability. The volatility of returns under
the realistic market composition is significantly lower than under the balanced popula-
tion (Sign test, Male:Female 95:5 vs. 50:50, z = −31.5912, p = 0.000).18 Contrary to
popular opinion, increasing the proportion of female traders does not reduce volatility.
This is due to the interactions between traders’ profits and their hormonal responses.
We can view the distribution of results as a range of possible outcomes for a trader
entering the market. If a trader is successful, correctly identifying profitable trades,
their risk aversion will go down and they will take on larger positions. They will then
have a larger effect on market prices and potentially drive trends. If, however, a trader
is unsuccessful and loses money, they will become more risk-averse and take smaller
15This low participation rate of female traders is highlighted by Coates (2012), however, exact figures
for this ratio are difficult to obtain.
16See for instance “Too much testosterone, too much confidence” in The Guardian, 2012.
17Note in using these ratio’s we implicitly specify that the choice of trading strategy is not determined
by gender.
18Results of pairwise Sign tests (analogue of paired t-test) are presented as volatility data are non-
normal and the paired differences are not symmetric.
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positions. Return volatility is driven by differences in opinion between traders. In
the former scenario traders take larger positions and so drive higher volatility. It is
the latter scenario, however, that occurs more frequently as, on average, positive feed-
back traders are outperformed by informed traders. Even though the positive feedback
traders can be lucky in some periods, on average they will have many more periods of
being successful than otherwise. The greater testosterone fluctuations of male traders
increase the scale of this effect. As a male trader loses money they become more risk-
averse than a female trader in the same position and so have a diminished effect on asset
returns. As a result a greater proportion of male traders in the market reduces overall
volatility.19 The same mechanism is even more evident in the benchmark market, in
this case the losing traders do not reduces their positions at all resulting in substantially
higher volatility.
While showing a lower average volatility, markets with a realistic composition exhibit
higher kurtosis and so are more prone to extreme price changes (Sign test, Male:Female
95:5 vs. 50:50, z = 31.2117, p = 0.000). At the same time these markets also have a
larger dispersion of volatility (Brown-Forsythe test, F statistic=10.1495, p = 0.000), in-
dicating lower stability and more periods of high volatility, than those under a balanced
composition. Extreme volatility typically occurs when the positive feedback traders cor-
rectly pick a trend and make a profit. The profit leads to higher testosterone levels and
so greater risk-taking. As a result the positive feedback traders are able to build and
continue the extreme event or bubble. The larger proportion of male traders exacer-
bates this effect resulting in more extreme returns and therefore greater volatility. At
some point, however, this bubble will burst as informed traders drive the price back
towards the fundamental value. While in the majority of cases the positive feedback
19This mechanism still holds if both informed and positive feedback traders are split into male and
female. The increase in demand from the male informed traders, pushes prices back towards the
fundamental, further reducing volatility.
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Table 2: Moments of Returns
Market Measure Male:Female Male:Female Benchmark p-value
50 : 50 95 : 5 (Non-Hormonal)
I II III (I vs. II)
Volatility (%) 0.125 0.105 0.442 0.000
(0.030) (0.033) (0.011)
Skewness 0.004 0.004 0.009 1.000
(0.084) (0.094) (0.068)
Kurtosis 2.667 2.871 2.312 0.000
(0.291) (0.463) (0.095)
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders.
Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders within the group of positive
feedback traders. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Market statistics are av-
eraged over 1000 runs, standard deviations across runs in parenthesis. p-values from pairwise
Sign test. Results from Benchmark market (III) are significantly different from I and II, all
p-values being 0. Parameters: ȳ = 1, εt ∼ U(−1, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100, V ar = 1,
c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
traders can not establish trends, when they do it results in higher volatility with more
male traders. In the benchmark setting, without hormonal effects these trends do not
establish and so a lower kurtosis is observed.
Taken together these results have substantial implications for the debate concerning
financial market stability. Increasing the proportion of female traders in the market will
have mixed results - an increase in daily volatility coupled with a decreased frequency
of extreme events. From a regulatory point of view the second of these concerns will be
generally dominant arguing for efforts to rebalance the population of traders. However,
our results show that this may be ‘politically’ difficult. The regulators may face po-
tential criticism as making this change may increase daily volatility. Many observers,
including the popular press and financial commentators, use volatility as a proxy for
risk, including the risk of catastrophic events. While our results show that the change
would indeed be beneficial in terms of reducing the risk of catastrophic events, the reg-
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ulator may struggle to make this point. In particular the main benefit, the decreased
frequency of rare extreme events would, by definition, be hard to observe and therefore
use as a justification.
4.3 Trader Performance
In this section we examine the relative performance of male traders and female traders.
Since gender affects risk aversion, it is natural to examine whether male positive feed-
back traders outperform female traders or vice versa.
Table 3 reports the periodical profits of informed traders in the market with half
informed traders and half positive feedback traders. Two sets of values are presented
with the first set representing the balanced male/female composition while the second
set corresponds to the real life composition of 95% male to 5% female. Informed traders
make positive payoffs on average, however, the size of their payoffs is affected by the
male/female proportions within the group of positive feedback traders.
The profits earned by informed traders decrease in the proportion of male traders
in the market (Sign test, Male: Female 50:50 vs. 95:5, z = 28.9981, p = 0.000). As
explained in Section 4.2, price volatility decreases in the proportion of male positive
feedback traders due to increased risk aversions. As the male positive feedback traders
trade less the price of the risky asset becomes largely driven by informed traders and
so becomes closer to the fundamental value. As a result there is little disagreement in
the market and so little trade. With male positive feedback traders less active in the
market, the total amount of wealth that transfers from positive feedback traders to the
informed traders decreases. In effect the larger fraction of male traders inadvertently
makes the market more informationally efficient.
In order to assess the relative performance of male and female traders, we compare
the volume weighted profit per period. This measure describes the average gains or
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Table 3: Normalized Profits
Informed Traders Male Female p-value
I II III I vs. II I vs. III II vs. III
Male:Female 50:50
Normalized profits 0.153 -0.163 -0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.023) (0.027) (0.022)
Dispersion 1.163 1.310 1.090 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.104) (0.160) (0.078)
Skewness 1.624 -2.149 -1.320 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.613) (0.903) (0.455)
Male:Female 95:5
Normalized profits 0.144 -0.145 -0.126 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.024) (0.025) (0.021)
Dispersion 1.212 1.237 1.050 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.143) (0.152) (0.079)
Skewness 1.920 -2.029 -1.252 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.828) (0.895) (0.464)
Male:Female 50:50 vs. Male:Female 95:5 (p-value)
Normalized profits 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dispersion 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skewness 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders.
Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders within the group of positive feed-
back traders. Normalized profits are volume weighted profits per period. Each simulation was a run
for 1000 time steps. Profits, dispersion and skewness are captured over the 1000 periods of trad-
ing in each run and then averaged over 1000 runs. Standard deviations across runs in parenthe-
sis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: ȳ = 1, εt ∼ U(−1, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100,
V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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losses on every share traded by the male and female traders. Using this measure re-
moves any across run and time effect on the payoffs due to different trading quantities,
leaving only the gender effect. We term this measure normalized profits. The results
in Table 3 show that male positive feedback traders achieve both inferior payoffs and
larger dispersion of the normalized profits compared to female positive feedback traders.
This is the case regardless of the relative proportions of male and female traders within
the population. Additionally the distribution of normalized profits for male positive
feedback traders is more heavily negatively skewed. The distribution exhibits a much
longer tail of losses compared to that of female positive feedback traders. As such male
traders have inferior performance on average and more often make the biggest losses.
While male traders underperform female traders on average their payoffs are also
more dispersed than those of female traders. In order to analyze the profits and losses
separately, the distributions of payoffs are partitioned by sign. Table 4 presents these
statistics. The results for profitable periods reveal an important result. The best-
performing male traders earn significantly more than the top-ranking female traders
(Maximum Positive Profits - Sign test, male vs. female, z = 31.5912, p = 0.000).
Whilst there is little difference between the average profits of male and female traders,
conditional on profits being positive, male trader payoffs additionally display signifi-
cantly larger dispersion and higher positive skewness than those of female traders.
Table 4 also shows that among those periods when positive feedback traders make
profits, female traders outperform male traders more frequently. However, when male
traders make higher profits than females, they outperform female traders by a large
amount. This is why the average profit of male traders, conditional on positive profits,
is little different from that of female traders. Rather than skills it is the excessive
risk-taking behavior that makes the best performing traders more likely to be male.
These findings have concerning implications for financial firms, regulators and those
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Table 4: Profits – Positive Outcomes
Male Female Male vs. Female
(p-value)
Male:Female 50:50
Positive profits 0.5981 0.5965 0.0022
(0.0344) (0.0283)
Dispersion 0.8029 0.6446 0.0000
(0.1323) (0.0640)
Skewness 2.8864 2.0043 0.0000
(0.7573) (0.4297)
Outperforming 30% 70% 0.0000
(0.0754) (0.0754)
Positive return periods 465 465
(13.8335) (13.8335)
Maximum positive profits 6.0035 4.1556 0.0000
(1.6331) (0.8102)
Male:Female 95:5
Positive profits 0.5921 0.5905 0.0017
(0.0334) (0.0280)
Dispersion 0.7589 0.6263 0.0000
(0.1235) (0.0611)
Skewness 2.7563 1.9383 0.0000
(0.7478) (0.4215)
Outperforming 31% 69% 0.0000
(0.0774) (0.0774)
Positive return periods 467 467
(14.1855) (14.1855)
Maximum positive profits 5.6248 4.0077 0.0000
(1.5367) (0.7911)
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders.
Profits analyzed here are positive normalized profits generated by male positive feedback traders
and female positive feedback traders. Normalized profits are volume weighted profits per period.
Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders within the group of positive feedback
traders. Outperforming is the fraction of periods that the given gender outperforms the other gen-
der. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Positive profit measures are captured over the
1000 periods of trading in each run and then averaged over 1000 runs. Standard deviations across
runs in parenthesis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: ȳ = 1, εt ∼ U(−1, 1), R = 1.01,
p∗ = 100, V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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wishing to change the gender balance in the financial markets. Even though male
traders may underperform female traders and make profits less often, reward schemes
in financial firms may still select towards large groups of male traders. Financial bonus
schemes typically reward the best performers and often lead to large numbers of other
traders being fired, potentially even those making small profits. It is important to note
that the better performing male traders in these experiments were not more skilled,
rather they were lucky. They made larger profits through riding their luck - decreasing
their risk aversion, and increasing their investment, in response to profits. The better
performing female traders are less susceptible to these effects and so make extreme
profits less frequently, even though they also lose money less often. As such testosterone
effects may explain why financial markets are dominated by men. Trying to rebalance
the population of traders to better match that of the population as a whole may require
a complete change in how financial firms reward their staff. A movement away from
large bonus’ for the best performers to a system that better rewards consistent profits.
4.4 Strategy
Our analysis of market stability has so far focused on the role of gender; the distribution
of informed to positive feedback traders, however, may also have an effect. There is
some disagreement with regard to the proportion of traders who use technical rules.
It has been estimated to be as high as 90% by Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor
and Allen (1992). Lewellen et al. (1980) place the figure between 27% and 38% while
Hoffmann and Shefrin (2014) suggest 32%. Much of this disagreement seems to stem
from the degree of usage of technical approaches with some traders using them as part,
rather than all, of their strategy. In this paper we base our analysis on the survey results
of Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) who find that in most cases the weight given to technical
trading is between 30% and 70%. In Table 5, we report results for two strategy mixes
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(the gender mix is held constant at the real composition of 95% male and 5% female).
The first set represents a market with 50% informed to 50% positive feedback traders,
and the second for a market with 70% informed to 30% positive feedback traders.
Table 5: Moments of Returns
Measure Informed:Positive Feedback p-value
50 : 50 70 : 30 50 : 50 vs. 70 : 30
Volatility (%) 0.105 0.080 0.000
(0.033) (0.028)
Skewness 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.094) (0.089)
Kurtosis 2.871 2.758 0.000
(0.463) (0.387)
Note: Results for market with 95% male to 5% female traders within the group of positive
feedback traders. Informed:Positive Feedback is the proportion of informed traders to positive
feedback traders in the market. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Market statis-
tics are averaged over 1000 runs, standard deviations across runs in parenthesis. p-values from
pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: ȳ = 1, εt ∼ U(−1, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100, V ar = 1,
c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
The results in Table 5 show that positive feedback traders are capable of destabiliz-
ing the market. The larger the proportion of these traders, the higher the volatility of
returns.20 Volatility of returns in a market with 70% informed traders to 30% positive
feedback traders is significantly lower than the scenario with 50% informed traders to
50% positive feedback traders. Positive feedback traders add volatility to the market
price while informed traders arbitrage mispricings bringing prices closer to the funda-
mental price and reducing volatility. The more informed traders there are in the market,
the greater is this effect and the closer is the price of the risky asset to its fundamental
value.
This stabilizing effect of informed traders is consistent with the literature on the
20This result was tested under different fractions of male and female traders and was found to hold
across all compositions.
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effect of heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets. Friedman (1953) and Campbell and
Kyle (1993) show that traders who know better the value of the asset make positive
profits and so eventually force the irrational traders out of market. In contrast, De
Long et al. (1990b) demonstrate that traders with wrong beliefs are able to increase
volatility sufficiently that informed traders are unable to drive them out of the market
and so some irrational traders persist in equilibrium. Similar results have been shown
by Brock and Hommes (1998) and Chiarella et al. (2006) amongst others. In our
model, positive feedback traders lose money in the long-run; however, their trading
behaviors impact asset returns while they have wealth available to do so. In the real
world, where new traders are continually arriving at the market as they are hired by
firms or start brokerage accounts, this implies that these traders will continue to add
volatility to returns. Traders who lose money and become ‘depressed’ over time might
consider switching strategies. Allowing traders to do this would not change the results
qualitatively. We tested the model with both types of traders having hormonal effects
and observed the same relationships. As the informed traders make profits, the increase
in demand from male informed traders pushes the price back towards the fundamental,
reducing volatility.
5 Conclusion
Scientists, policy makers and the popular press have argued that having more female
traders would make financial markets more stable. Using an asset pricing model that
incorporates a link between risk preferences and trading results we show that the ef-
fects of a more balanced gender composition maybe more nuanced. An increase in the
proportion of female traders may increase the volatility of returns under certain mar-
ket conditions; however, the chances of extreme events, such as crashes, are reduced.
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Further, while female traders outperform their male counterparts in terms of average
earnings, the best (and the worst) performing traders are likely to be male given the
impact of testosterone.
We study the effect of change in gender balance on the overall market return; specif-
ically, we examine a counterfactual scenario where the gender composition of traders
is drastically different from what it is in the current reality and observe its effect on
market outcomes. Nevertheless, one could wonder whether or not there might be forces
that would provide resistance to attempts to bring a more balanced gender composi-
tion in the financial markets. This brings us to the important topic of how traders
are evaluated in the financial firms where they work. Our formal model keeps fixed
the set of traders to observe how trading performance affects their future behavior and
the effect that has on the market. This is done specifically to highlight the effect of
gender differences of traders, abstracting away from any other factor that might affect
the market outcomes. In real life one of those factors would presumably be a change
in the set of traders who trade - in particular, one would expect successful traders to
be given prominence and the less successful ones perhaps even replaced. While we plan
to examine these various other dynamic effects in our future research, it is clear that
the ultimate effects of changes in gender balance will depend on how firms recruit new
traders and also how they reward or let go their existing set of traders. In an environ-
ment of highly selective performance-based evaluation, such as that seen in financial
firms, one would expect the population to be increasingly biased towards male traders
even though they on average underperform. As such the ‘overly male’ culture of finan-
cial firms may itself be driven by testosterone and reward systems. In order to increase
the number of female traders it may be necessary to fundamentally change the bonus
culture of investing: for example, to move away from a system that disproportionately
rewards “best performers” to one that rewards more the consistent profit makers even
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though the amount of profits made (per period) may be more modest.
The work we have presented in this paper in an important step in modeling the
relationship between hormones and market stability. The physiological pathways un-
derlying the relationship between stimuli, hormonal responses and risk aversion are,
however, still being explored. The model we present intuitively captures the key rela-
tionships observed experimentally in the literature. There are aspects of this relation-
ship that are still not currently understood, for instance as we highlight above whether
gains should be measured relative to zero (no profit/loss) or the traders expectation.
In the same way where is little evidence about whether changes in hormone levels are
symmetric in response to equal stimuli and whether that symmetry is the same between
men and women. As this literature develops and our understanding of these relation-
ships improves our theoretical framework may be refined to provide further predictions
for investigation. The model could similarly be extended to look at other elements of
preferences. In this paper we have focused on risk aversion - the willingness of individ-
ual to take risks of a given magnitude, however, other elements may also affect trading
behavior such as enjoyment of trading itself. Systematic differences between genders
along these lines could be added to the model to understand the interacting motivations
effecting an individuals willingness to trade.
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Appendices
A Extension with Different Stochastic Processes
In the description below, we check the robustness of results to different dividend pro-
cesses.
We first consider a first order auto-regressive process, AR(1),
yt = b+ ρyt−1 + εt (A.1)
where the White noise {εt} has a mean of zero. This specification addresses the possibil-
ity that market information is correlated across periods, and dividends depend linearly
on past values. In order to compare with the first stochastic process, the means of
dividends are set to be equal, b
1−ρ = ȳ, with parameters b = 0.639, ρ = 0.361.
Consistent with Section 4.2, results show that volatility decreases in the male pro-
portion of positive feedback traders, holding the proportion of informed to positive
feedback traders fixed (see Table A.1). Returns are more stable with an increased
proportion of informed traders relative to positive feedback traders (see Table A.2).
The relative performance of traders is in line with that of Section 4.3 (see Table A.3).
Informed traders make positive profits both in terms of average periodical profits and
cumulative profits over the 1000 periods of trading. Male positive feedback traders
perform worse than female positive feedback traders on average, while the group of
positive feedback traders makes losses on average. Consistent with our main results,
the greater dispersion of volatility due to a larger male proportion of positive feedback
traders persists with AR(1) type dividends (Brown-Forsythe test for variance of volatil-
ity, F statistic= 4.8237, p = 0.028). In addition, the level of volatility is significantly
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higher than that of our baseline economy (with dividend yt = ȳ + εt), even though
the two sets of stochastic dividends themselves have the same level of dispersion (e.g.,
Sign test for levels of volatility with Male: Female 95:5, AR(1) vs. IID, z = 31.5912,
p = 0.000).
Table A.1: Moments of Returns
Market Measure Benchmark Male:Female Male:Female p-value
(Non-Hormonal) 50 : 50 95 : 5
I II III (II vs. III)
Volatility (%) 0.8431 0.5358 0.5146 0.0000
(0.0291) (0.0522) (0.0570)
Skewness 0.0110 0.0031 0.0028 0.0177
(0.1083) (0.1117) (0.1130)
Kurtosis 3.0006 3.0646 3.0842 0.0000
(0.2235) (0.2485) (0.2675)
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders
with AR(1) dividend process. Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders within
the group of positive feedback traders. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Market
statistics are averaged over 1000 runs, standard deviations across runs in parenthesis. p-values from
pairwise Sign tests. Results from Benchmark market (I) is significantly different from II and III,
all p-values being 0. Parameters: b = 0.639, ρ = 0.361, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100,
V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
The next stochastic dividend process is a two-state Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) pro-
cess, where the dividend yt is generated from the following stochastic process
yt = e
−λω∆tyt−1 + µ





εt is a Wiener process and σ > 0. The state of the economy is represented by ω,
where ω ∈ {high, low}, with mean values of dividends µhigh > µlow, and λω is the
speed of mean reversion, 0 < λhigh < λlow. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is a
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Table A.2: Moments of Returns
Measure Informed:Positive Feedback p-value
50 : 50 70 : 30 50 : 50 vs. 70 : 30
Volatility (%) 0.515 0.479 0.000
(0.057) (0.049)
Skewness 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.113) (0.111)
Kurtosis 3.084 3.052 0.000
(0.267) (0.253)
Note: Results for market with 95% male to 5% female traders within the group of positive
feedback traders with AR(1) dividend process. Informed:Positive Feedback is the proportion of in-
formed traders to positive feedback traders in the market. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time
steps. Market statistics are averaged over 1000 runs, standard deviations across runs in parenthe-
sis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: b = 0.639, ρ = 0.361, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01,
p∗ = 100, V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
modified random walk, in which the process tends to revert back to its long term
mean. The mean is higher during expansions and lower in contractions. This two-state
process is adopted to capture the boom and bust of an economy. The state switching
mechanism is controlled by an unobservable state variable that follows a Markov chain
permitting multiple structural changes with unknown timing of state switching.21 In
reality, economic conditions change over time and switching of states could be in line
with business cycles or caused by short-term dynamics in the market. The Markov
switching model used here captures the exogenous changes to the economy.
Parameters for this model are α = 0.99, σ = 1, ∆t = 1, λhigh = 1, λlow = 1.3,
µhigh = 1.0576, µlow = 0.95, εt ∼ N(0, 1).22 Tables A.5, A.6, A.7, and A.8 present
results on market stability and traders’ performance.
21The probability of staying in the same state for the next period is denoted by α.
22In order to compare with the other two dividend processes, the pair of state means (µhigh = 1.0576,
µlow = 0.95) in the OU process are set to match the average and dispersion of the dividend paths from
the other two processes. We tested different pairs of state means satisfying the conditions and results
are qualitatively similar for other paired values.
30
Table A.3: Normalized Profits
Informed Traders Male Female p-value
I II III I vs. II I vs. III II vs. III
Male:Female 50:50
Normalized profits 0.164 -0.174 -0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.035) (0.039) (0.034)
Dispersion 1.631 1.790 1.553 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.178) (0.254) (0.142)
Skewness 1.510 -1.927 -1.271 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.039) (1.376) (0.850)
Male:Female 95:5
Normalized profits 0.158 -0.159 -0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033)
Dispersion 1.697 1.729 1.518 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.235) (0.249) (0.146)
Skewness 1.760 -1.854 -1.230 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.288) (1.372) (0.868)
Male:Female 50:50 vs. Male:Female 95:5 (p-value)
Normalized profits 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dispersion 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skewness 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders
with AR(1) dividend process. Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders
within the group of positive feedback traders. Normalized profits are volume weighted profits per
period. Profits, dispersion and skewness are captured over the 1000 periods of trading in each run
and then averaged over 1000 runs. Standard deviations across runs in parenthesis. p-values from
pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: b = 0.639, ρ = 0.361, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100,
V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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Table A.4: Profits –Positive Outcomes
Male Female Male vs. Female
(p-value)
Male:Female 50:50
Positive profits 0.7899 0.7898 0.0149
(0.0576) (0.0516)
Dispersion 1.2460 1.0701 0.0000
(0.2397) (0.1387)
Skewness 3.8636 3.1123 0.0000
(1.3397) (0.9255)
Outperforming 32% 68% 0.0000
(0.0787) (0.0787)
Positive return periods 470 470
(11.7737) (11.7737)
Male:Female 95:5
Positive profits 0.7827 0.7820 0.0820
(0.0580) (0.0525)
Dispersion 1.2058 1.0516 0.0000
(0.2292) (0.1372)
Skewness 3.7750 3.0785 0.0000
(1.3213) (0.9216)
Outperforming 33% 67% 0.0000
(0.0771) (0.0771)
Positive return periods 473 473
(11.5674) (11.5674)
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders with
AR(1) dividend process. Profits analyzed here are positive normalized profits generated by male pos-
itive feedback traders and female positive feedback traders. Normalized profits are volume weighted
profits per period. Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders within the group
of positive feedback traders. Outperforming is the fraction of periods that the given gender outper-
forms the other gender. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Positive profit measures are
captured over the 1000 periods of trading in each run and then averaged over 1000 runs. p-values
from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: b = 0.639, ρ = 0.361, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100,
V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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With the two-state Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dividend process, results are qualitatively
similar to our baseline model. Specifically, informed traders still make positive profits
over time. Meanwhile, return volatility decreases in the male proportion of positive
feedback traders. Compared to the results from the baseline model and the AR(1)
scenario, results for the two-state OU process show significantly higher levels of return
volatilities and higher profits for the informed traders. Consistent with previous dis-
cussions, normalized gains or losses obtained by female positive feedback traders are
significantly higher than those of male traders. Male traders marginally outperform
female traders conditional on profits are made under the realistic gender composition.
Our baseline economy and the extensions here all show that volatility of returns
decreases in the male proportion of positive feedback traders given the impact of testos-
terone and informed traders make positive net profits over the trading periods. When
traders respond differently to positive and negative outcomes, prices are less volatile in
markets with more male traders. Meanwhile, male positive feedback traders do worse
than female traders in terms of both average profit and the dispersion of average per
share returns.
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Table A.5: Moments of Returns
Market Measure Benchmark Male:Female Male:Female p-value
(Non-Hormonal) 50 : 50 95 : 5
I II III (II vs. III)
Volatility (%) 0.982 0.662 0.642 0.000
(0.075) (0.087) (0.091)
Skewness 0.031 0.017 0.015 0.009
(0.288) (0.481) (0.507)
Kurtosis 6.877 13.625 14.600 0.000
(1.873) (4.140) (4.553)
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders with
two-state Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dividend process. Male:Female is the proportion of male traders
to female traders within the group of positive feedback traders. Each simulation was a run for
1000 time steps. Market statistics are averaged over 1000 runs, standard deviations across runs
in parenthesis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Results from Benchmark market (I) is sig-
nificantly different from II and III, all p-values being 0. Parameters: λhigh = 1, λlow = 1.3,
µhigh = 1.0576, µlow = 0.95, α = 0.99, σ = 1, ∆t = 1, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100,
V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
Table A.6: Moments of Returns
Measure Informed:Positive Feedback p-value
50 : 50 70 : 30 50 : 50 vs. 70 : 30
Volatility (%) 0.642 0.609 0.000
(0.091) (0.085)
Skewness 0.015 0.012 0.548
(0.507) (0.543)
Kurtosis 14.600 16.202 0.000
(4.553) (4.916)
Note: Results for market with 95% male to 5% female traders within the group of positive
feedback traders with two-state Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dividend process. Informed:Positive Feedback
is the proportion of informed traders to positive feedback traders in the market. Each simulation
was a run for 1000 time steps. Market statistics are averaged over 1000 runs, standard deviations
across runs in parenthesis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: λhigh = 1, λlow = 1.3,
µhigh = 1.0576, µlow = 0.95, α = 0.99, σ = 1, ∆t = 1, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01, p∗ = 100,
V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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Table A.7: Normalized Profits
Informed Traders Male Female p-value
I II III I vs. II I vs. III II vs. III
Male:Female 50:50
Normalized profits 0.181 -0.192 -0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.040) (0.044) (0.038)
Dispersion 1.891 2.072 1.803 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.242) (0.336) (0.196)
Skewness 1.682 -2.099 -1.449 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.442) (1.795) (1.253)
Male:Female 95:5
Normalized profits 0.175 -0.176 -0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.042) (0.043) (0.038)
Dispersion 1.965 2.002 1.763 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.305) (0.323) (0.196)
Skewness 1.917 -2.014 -1.402 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.680) (1.774) (1.256)
Male:Female 50:50 vs. Male:Female 95:5 (p-value)
Normalized profits 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dispersion 0.000 0.000 0.000
Skewness 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders
with two-state Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dividend process. Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to
female traders within the group of positive feedback traders. Normalized profits are volume weighted
profits per period. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Profits, dispersion and skewness
are captured over the 1000 periods of trading in each run and then averaged over 1000 runs. Stan-
dard deviations across runs in parenthesis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: λhigh = 1,
λlow = 1.3, µhigh = 1.0576, µlow = 0.95, α = 0.99, σ = 1, ∆t = 1, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01,
p∗ = 100, V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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Table A.8: Profits –Positive Outcomes
Male Female Male vs. Female
(p-value)
Male:Female 50:50
Positive profits 0.8802 0.8800 0.0003
(0.0710) (0.0641)
Dispersion 1.4610 1.2654 0.0000
(0.3047) (0.1851)
Skewness 4.2266 3.5418 0.0000
(1.5081) (1.1668)
Outperforming 32% 68% 0.0000
(0.0798) (0.0798)
Positive return periods 471 471
(11.8543) (11.8543)
Male:Female 95:5
Positive profits 0.8725 0.8718 0.0059
(0.0710) (0.0651)
Dispersion 1.4153 1.2441 0.0000
(0.2895) (0.1813)
Skewness 4.1416 3.5074 0.0000
(1.4896) (1.1577)
Outperforming 33% 67% 0.0000
(0.0790) (0.0790)
Positive return periods 473 473
(11.5073) (11.5073)
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders with two-state
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dividend process. Profits analyzed here are positive normalized profits generated
by male positive feedback traders and female positive feedback traders. Normalized profits are volume
weighted profits per period. Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders within
the group of positive feedback traders. Outperforming is the fraction of periods that the given gen-
der outperforms the other gender. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Positive profit
measures are captured over the 1000 periods of trading in each run and then averaged over 1000
runs. Standard deviations across runs in parenthesis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters:
λhigh = 1, λlow = 1.3, µhigh = 1.0576, µlow = 0.95, α = 0.99, σ = 1, ∆t = 1, εt ∼ N(0, 1), R = 1.01,
p∗ = 100, V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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B Extension with Informed Traders Having Time
Varying Risk Preferences
In this section we consider the populations of both informed and positive feedback
traders being composed of male and female individuals with time-varying risk prefer-
ences.
Table B.1 reports the risk aversion of male and female traders in the market with
50% informed traders and 50% positive feedback traders. Informed traders have lower
risk aversion compared to the positive feedback traders. On average, male traders
have higher risk aversion compared to female traders, which is driven by the high
risk aversion among the male positive feedback trading group. For informed traders,
willingness to trade is higher among men compared to women. As for traders with
the positive feedback trading strategy, male traders have lower willingness to trade on
average.23
23Results on market quality are consistent with the previous simulations in Section 4.2.
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Table B.1: Risk Aversions (RA)
Measurement Male Traders Female Traders Male vs. Female
(p-value)
Male:Female 50 : 50
Both Types of Strategies 4.222 3.297 0.000
Informed Traders 1.175 1.870 0.000
(0.599) (0.430)
Positive Feedback Traders 7.269 4.724 0.000
(2.554) (0.898)
Male:Female 95 : 5
Both Types of Strategies 3.884 3.217 0.000
Informed Traders 1.272 1.956 0.000
(0.574) (0.399)
Positive Feedback Traders 6.497 4.477 0.000
(2.063) (0.763)
Note: Results for market with 50% informed traders to 50% positive feedback traders.
Male:Female is the proportion of male traders to female traders within the group of positive feedback
traders. Each simulation was a run for 1000 time steps. Risk aversion measures are captured over
the 1000 periods of trading in each run and then averaged over 1000 runs. Standard deviations across
runs in parenthesis. p-values from pairwise Sign tests. Parameters: ȳ = 1, εt ∼ U(−1, 1), R = 1.01,
p∗ = 100, V ar = 1, c = 0.2, g = 0.5, κF = 0.04865, κM = 0.0973, γ = 0.2569, T = 1000, N = 1000.
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